Security & Compliance Automation Platform
UnderDefense MAXI is the solution to day-to-day cybersecurity problems of IT leaders and teams. It builds your 24/7 business protection together with you on the driver’s seat.
UnderDefense MAXI Platform
UnderDefense Secures Top Honor at the 2025 Global Infosec Awards
We’re proud of being a winner at the 2025 Global Infosec Awards…
10-Point AWS Security Checklist for Executives
Quickly assess your cloud security posture with this executive-ready checklist covering IAM, monitoring, and compliance essentials.
Anti-Phishing Playbook
Your free PDF guide to spotting and stopping phishing attacks before they reach your team or data.
24/7 Threat Detection & MAXImum Responsiveness
Our human-led MDR service combines expert insight and automation and AI for fast, precise threat response. Get full context in 2 minutes and cut MTTC to 15, staying ahead of ransomware and other attacks.
Calculate your MDR price
Pay only for the services you actually need, with no hidden costs.
10-Point AWS Security Checklist for Executives
Quickly assess your cloud security posture with this executive-ready checklist covering IAM, monitoring, and compliance essentials.
Anti-Phishing Playbook
Your free PDF guide to spotting and stopping phishing attacks before they reach your team or data.
Spot threats faster and respond smarter than tools alone
24/7 MDR and SOC services led by award-winning security experts. We act as an extension to your team or as a fully remote team, providing detailed threat insights and actionable responses to secure your environment immediately.
UnderDefense is an AWS Partner
We’re excited to announce that UnderDefense is now an AWS partner and available on AWS Marketplace…
Managed SOC at Your Service
Augment your SOC with 24/7 monitoring, threat detection, and expert response—without the overhead. Integrated with your existing tools, our SOCaaS stops attacks before they cause harm.
Managed SIEM Pricing Guide
Download a clear, practical overview of Managed SIEM pricing, featuring detailed breakdowns by service type, pricing model, real-world pros and cons, and key cost factors.
Managed SOC at Your Service
Augment your SOC with 24/7 monitoring, threat detection, and expert response—without the overhead. Integrated with your existing tools, our SOCaaS stops attacks before they cause harm.
Managed SIEM Pricing Guide
Download a clear, practical overview of Managed SIEM pricing, featuring detailed breakdowns by service type, pricing model, real-world pros and cons, and key cost factors.
CrazyHunter ransomware recovery team on standby
CrazyHunter emerged in 2024 as a Go-based ransomware targeting Taiwanese healthcare, education, and government organisations, abusing legitimate tools like GOAnyWhere and Rclone to move and exfiltrate data. Isolate affected systems immediately and engage UnderDefense's incident response team — do not attempt recovery or negotiation alone.
Average Mttc
Ransom-Free recovery rate
Avoided in ransom
Global availability
Systems restored
IR experts
Ransomware cases resolved
IR experience
Do NOT attempt any self-remediation, as it can trigger further encryption and destroy recovery points. Instead, follow these steps:
Contact us now for urgent ransomware response assistance, 24/7
Get Help Now
Accomplishments and recognitions, demonstrating our commitment to excellence and innovation.
Momentum Leader in MDR
Best Support in MDR & IR
Managed Detection and Response (MDR)
Top Cybersecurity Company 2025
Best Managed Detection and Response Service
#4 of 184 teams Splunk Boss of the SOC
Best Of Cybersecurity Awards for Q1 2025
AWS Partner
Splunk Manage Premier Partner
Like a crime scene, a ransomware attack must be preserved — tampering with encrypted files, attempting self-recovery, or engaging with attackers can destroy critical evidence and reduce your chances of recovery.
Taking the right steps in the first moments after a CrazyHunter attack can make a huge difference and help you make a full recovery. Request 24/7 CrazyHunter ransomware recovery services to decrypt your data and maximize your chances of restoring operations.
CrazyHunter victims exhibit specific IOCs including .Hunter file extensions on encrypted files, evidence of BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) exploitation, and SharpGPOAbuse tool usage for lateral movement. Watch for unusual PowerShell execution, Active Directory abuse patterns, vulnerable driver loading, and ChaCha20 encryption activity. Evidence of credential enumeration via weak AD account password spraying and compromised domain credentials indicates CrazyHunter presence.
CrazyHunter uses ChaCha20 stream cipher as its primary encryption algorithm with a distinctive partial encryption strategy: one byte encrypted followed by two unencrypted bytes, creating a 1:2 encryption ratio. ECIES (Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme) is used for asymmetric key encryption, ensuring decryption is impossible without the attacker's private ECIES key. This hybrid approach balances encryption strength with performance.
CrazyHunter operates as a financially motivated ransomware group with no apparent RaaS structure. Attacks suggest manual effort with focus on selective targeting of high-value victims in Taiwan healthcare sector. The group appears to work independently rather than recruiting affiliates. Double extortion is deployed: files encrypted while data is exfiltrated and listed on CrazyHunter's leak site.
Primary leverage combines operational disruption in critical healthcare systems with data publication threats. The group publishes victim data on Tor leak sites and threatens to sell or publicly release sensitive medical records, patient information, and system configurations. Healthcare sector targeting suggests awareness that hospitals face extreme pressure to pay due to patient safety implications.
CrazyHunter targets Windows-based systems with specific focus on healthcare organizations in Taiwan. The group appears to prioritize organizations managing critical patient care systems and medical records. Six confirmed victims are all healthcare entities, suggesting vertical specialization. Hospitals with large patient populations and critical infrastructure dependencies are preferred targets.
Ransom notes with standardized format appear in encrypted directories containing victim-specific instructions, Tor onion site URLs for negotiation, cryptocurrency wallet addresses, and references to exfiltrated data. Notes emphasize healthcare sector targeting and data sensitivity to maximize pressure on victims.
No public decryption tool is available for CrazyHunter. The malware uses strong ChaCha20+ECIES encryption with private ECIES keys held exclusively by the threat actor. Decryption requires ransom payment (with no guarantee of functionality) or restoration from clean backups.
Specific indicators include .Hunter file extensions on encrypted files, SharpGPOAbuse tool artifacts, BYOVD exploitation evidence (vulnerable driver loading), unusual PowerShell execution patterns, and Active Directory enumeration activity. Network signatures may detect communication with CrazyHunter infrastructure.
File Extensions
All encrypted files append .Hunter extension (e.g., patient_records.sql.Hunter, config.xml.Hunter). The extension is consistent across all CrazyHunter incidents.
Ransom Note Filenames
“CrazyHunter_Ransom.txt”, “READ_ME_RECOVERY.txt”, or similar standardized filenames appearing in encrypted directories and system roots.
CrazyHunter Hashes
CrazyHunter samples share code patterns with Prince ransomware, reflecting the group’s use of modified Prince source code. Specific hashes vary across campaigns; behavioral analysis is more reliable than signature-based detection.
CrazyHunter Tools
Legitimate administrative tools: RDP, WinRM, PowerShell; SharpGPOAbuse for Group Policy abuse; vulnerable drivers (capcom.sys exploitation); Rclone for data exfiltration; GOAnyWhere (open-source tool); credential enumeration utilities.
Most Common Red Flag (Commands)
PowerShell commands: Get-ADUser with password spraying patterns, SharpGPOAbuse execution for privilege escalation via Group Policy, evidence of vulnerable driver loading (capcom.sys, etc.); Rclone commands for data exfiltration; unusual SYSTEM-level process execution; evidence of BYOVD exploitation.
Attack vector | % of CrazyHunter incidents | Notes |
Weak Active Directory Passwords | 50% | Credential spraying against domain accounts |
Phishing & Initial Access | 25% | Email-based credential harvesting or malicious attachments |
Unpatched Vulnerabilities | 15% | CVEs in healthcare management software |
Supply Chain/Third-Party Access | 10% | Compromised partner or vendor accounts |
Six confirmed Taiwan healthcare victims reported in early 2025. Recovery timelines averaged 3–8 weeks post-incident for most affected organizations. One organization paid ransom estimated at NT$50 million (~$1.6M USD); others engaged negotiation with law enforcement involvement. Operational disruption in critical care systems lasted 1–4 weeks during recovery.
Immediately isolate infected systems from the network and disable all network access. Reset all Active Directory user credentials, particularly administrative and service accounts. Preserve forensic evidence of infection including PowerShell execution logs, driver loading artifacts, and file encryption timestamps. Restore encrypted files from clean backup copies predating the infection. Scan systems for persistence mechanisms, backdoors, and vulnerable driver artifacts. Remove any loaded vulnerable drivers (capcom.sys, etc.) from system memory and disk.
Restore all encrypted files from verified clean backup repositories created before encryption. Rebuild all user credentials with strong passwords and implement multi-factor authentication on all accounts. Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions with focus on PowerShell execution, driver loading, and privilege escalation detection. Implement network segmentation to restrict access to critical healthcare systems. Enforce data loss prevention (DLP) tools to monitor for Rclone and suspicious data transfer activity. Maintain offline, immutable backup copies to prevent future encryption of recovery infrastructure.
CrazyHunter demands range from NT$20 million to NT$100 million+ (~$650K to $3.2M USD) depending on victim healthcare organization size, patient population, and perceived ability to pay. Healthcare organizations with large critical care operations face the highest demands. Negotiated settlements have reportedly reduced demands by 40–60%.
10 reasons why you should choose the UnderDefense ransomware recovery consulting services:
Get Help NowCrazyHunter is a Go-based ransomware variant derived from Prince ransomware, emerging in mid-2024 and escalating in sophistication and targeting frequency by early 2025. The group specializes in attacking healthcare organizations in Taiwan, using advanced evasion techniques including BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) exploitation and Group Policy abuse. CrazyHunter combines ChaCha20 stream cipher encryption with ECIES asymmetric encryption, employing a distinctive partial encryption strategy. The group has demonstrated rapid evolution in attack techniques and evasion capabilities.
The CrazyHunter threat actor’s geographic origin is unconfirmed but operational focus on Taiwan organizations suggests potential regional knowledge and language capability. Targeting patterns and tool selection suggest operators familiar with Asian healthcare infrastructure and business practices. Law enforcement has not publicly attributed CrazyHunter to specific nation-states.
CrazyHunter attacks follow a staged approach: Initial access via weak Active Directory credentials through password spraying attacks or phishing-based credential harvesting. Lateral movement using compromised domain credentials and legitimate administrative tools (RDP, WinRM, PowerShell). Privilege escalation via SharpGPOAbuse exploiting Group Policy or BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) exploitation using vulnerable drivers like capcom.sys. Data exfiltration using Rclone or GOAnyWhere tools to attacker-controlled servers. File encryption deployment using ChaCha20 with ECIES asymmetric key handling. Ransom note placement in encrypted directories. Victim notification via Tor leak site publication.
CrazyHunter campaigns typically span 2–4 weeks from initial access to encryption deployment, depending on network complexity and security controls. The group conducts targeting and reconnaissance to identify critical healthcare systems prior to payload deployment. Encryption phase typically completes within 24–72 hours once privilege escalation is achieved. Negotiation begins immediately upon victim discovery of ransom notes.
No public decryption tools are available for CrazyHunter. The malware uses strong ChaCha20+ECIES encryption with private ECIES keys held exclusively by the threat actor. Decryption requires ransom payment (with no guarantee of functionality) or restoration from clean backup copies. The group has demonstrated willingness to provide functional decryption keys post-payment in several cases.
Payment has resulted in decryption key provision in several documented cases, though no guarantee exists. Exfiltrated data may still be sold or published despite payment. The group operates under no legal enforcement mechanisms. Payment increases likelihood of future targeting and demonstrates financial capability to the broader threat actor ecosystem.
Implement multi-factor authentication on all administrative and user accounts, particularly domain credentials. Conduct regular Active Directory audits and password spraying tests to identify weak credentials. Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions with focus on PowerShell execution, driver loading, and privilege escalation detection. Implement Group Policy monitoring to detect abuse. Segment networks to restrict administrative access to critical healthcare systems. Patch and monitor systems for vulnerable drivers (capcom.sys, etc.). Implement data loss prevention (DLP) tools to detect Rclone and suspicious data transfer activity.
– Audit all Active Directory credentials and reset weak passwords – Deploy multi-factor authentication on all administrative accounts – Monitor for password spraying and credential enumeration activity – Detect and remove vulnerable drivers (capcom.sys) – Enable PowerShell logging and script block execution monitoring – Restrict administrative access to critical healthcare systems – Monitor for Rclone and suspicious file transfer activity – Verify backup integrity and test offline restoration procedures
CrazyHunter demonstrates strong preference for healthcare organizations in Taiwan, with all confirmed victims being hospitals or healthcare providers. The group appears to specialize in healthcare sector targeting, suggesting operational knowledge of healthcare systems, regulatory pressures, and payment capabilities. Secondary targeting of education and government sectors in Taiwan has been suggested but not confirmed.
BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) exploitation allows attackers to load legitimate but vulnerable drivers (like capcom.sys) to bypass security controls. CrazyHunter’s use of this technique demonstrates technical sophistication and awareness of kernel-level exploit methods. BYOVD enables privilege escalation, security software circumvention, and direct kernel access for malware operations. This technique is particularly effective against modern EDR/XDR solutions relying on user-mode monitoring.